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Epley: Confusing Communications -- Analyzing South Carolina's Stance on

CONFUSING COMMUNICATIONS-ANALYZING
SOUTH CAROLINA'S STANCE ON Ex PARTE
COMMUNICATION WITH FORMER EMPLOYEES
I.

INTRODUCION

As an attorney, new clients come into your office every day eager for you
to listen, ask questions, give advice, and hopefully agree to represent them. So
one day a potential client walks into your office and tells you that two months
ago she slipped and fell on the freshly waxed floor in the deli department of the
local branch of a national supermarket. At first she thought that she was fine,
but a recent visit to the doctor revealed that the fall re-aggravated an old back
injury, resulting in the need for extensive doctor's care and medication.
Because you are a responsible member of the bar, before filing suit you take it
upon yourself to fully investigate the matter to eliminate the risk of possible
sanctions for bringing a frivolous law suit.' When you go to the supermarket,
you learn that during the past two months the deli attendant who waxed the
floor, the delicatessen supervisor, and the store manager on duty the day of
your client's accident have left the employment of the supermarket chain.
Unfortunately, these individuals are the precise employees with whom you
need to speak in your investigation. New questions now arise concerning these
potential ex parte communications because the employees with whomyou need
to speak are all nowformer employees of the grocery store. Your new client is
in physical and financial pain, but you do not want to risk partaking in an
unethical investigation orusing communication techniques that violate the rules
of professional conduct outlined in the South Carolina Rules of Court.2
Taking into consideration all of these factors, how do you proceed with
your investigation? Is it necessary to contact these employees through the
supermarket's counsel? Should you investigate to see if these employees have
their own private counsel? Does it make a difference if the former employee
previously held an upper-level position? When you finally do get to talk to
these employees, how should you proceed? Ifyou break any of the professional
rules of conduct, are you subject to disciplinary action?
This Comment provides attorneys working in South Carolina with a much
needed roadmap on how to approach these situations. Part II starts with the
history of applicable ethics and evidence rules and then examines ethics
opinions and case law concerning ex parte communications with former
employees. Part III focuses on South Carolina ethics opinions and case law.

1. See S.C. App. Cr. R.407, R. 3.1; S.C. R. Civ. P. 11 (providing that the court may enforce
sanctions if the movant fails to make a good faith effort to resolve the dispute); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 15-36-10 to -50 (West Supp. 1999) (South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions
Act).
2. S.C. ApP. Cr. R. 407.
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Finally, Part IV of this Comment analyzes the current situation concerning ex
parte communications within South Carolina and gives attorneys guidance on
how to conduct a proper ex parte communication.
II. ABA AND STATE ETHICS AND EVIDENCE RULES AND RULINGS
A. ABA andSouth CarolinaEthics and Evidence Rules
1. ABA Provisions
The American Bar Association (ABA) has always placed a high priority
on protecting parties from communication with the opposing party's counsel.'
The ethical prohibition against such communications stems from a treatise
wherein David Hoffman expounded on the ethical prohibition against
conversing with the opposing attorney's client.4 Professional Ethics Canon 9,
enacted in 1908, included the requirement that lawyers should not
"communicate upon the subjects of controversy with a party represented by
counsel; much less should [attorneys] undertake to negotiate or compromise the
matter with, but should deal only with his counsel." 5 In 1969 the American Bar
Association adopted the Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, which
superseded the 1908 Canons.6 The Model Code's Disciplinary Rule 7-104
stated that a lawyer should not "[c]ommunicate or cause another to
communicate on the subject of the representation with a party he knows to be
represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior consent of the
lawyer representing such other party or is authorized by law to do so." 7 Later,
when the ABA adopted the Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct, the ABA
adhered to most of the original language of DR 7-104 and incorporated it into
the new Model Rule 4.2.'
2. South Carolina'sAppellate CourtRule 4.2
South Carolina's version of Model Rule 4.2 provides: "In representing a
client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation
with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the

3. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1996) (stating the
"public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of
a lawyer").
4. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 396 (1995) (quoting
Hoffman's treatise and stating that witnesses should not communicate with opposing counsel).
5. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSBILrry Canon 9 (1996).
6. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof. Responsibility, Formal Op. 396 (1995).
7. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A)(1) (1996).
8. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucrR. 4.2 (2000); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Prof 1Responsibility, Formal Op. 396 (1995) (noting that the Model Code's language
closely resembles the Model Rules's language).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol52/iss4/17
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matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized
by law to do so."9 Rule 4.2 does notprohibit communications regarding matters
not involved in the current dispute, nor does it prohibit communications that
have independent justification." However, the comment to Rule 4.2 prohibits
communications with an organization's managers or any otherpersonnel whose
actions or "statement[s] may constitute an admission on the part of the
organization.""1 The comment also states that the "Rule also covers any person,
whether or not a party to a formal proceeding, who is represented by counsel
concerning the matter in question."' 2 In circumstances such as the one outlined
in the introduction of this Comment, where lawyers need to speak with former
employees, do all former employees speak and act on behalf of the
organization? Specifically, can a former manager's statements and actions
constitute an admission of the company? How can an employee who no longer
works for the company still speak for or impute the company? Certainly, while
employees work for an organization they enjoy the benefits of having the
protection and representation of the company's counsel. The law is quite clear
regarding current employees: Ex parte communications are forbidden. 3
However, it is not clear whether former employees are presumed to speak on
behalf of the corporation. 4 Once an employee leaves or is dismissed from a
company, does that employee still enjoy the company's counsel? The uncertain
and unclear language of the comment to Rule 4.2 necessarily leads to problems
in applying Rule 4.2 to former employees. Thus, the question arises whether
the prohibitions outlined in Rule 4.2 apply to all employees or to only a
company's current employees.
The answer to the question is important because an attorney who violates
the Rules of Professional Conduct may suffer serious repercussions." For
instance, the violating attorney may be removed from the case. 6 An attorney's
removal will cost both the attorney and the client valuable time and money. The
judge may also choose to remedy a Rule 4.2 violation by ordering the
suppression of the ex parte statements. 7 The suppression of these statements

9. S.C. App. CL R. 407, R. 4.2.
10. S.C. APP. Cr. R. 407, R. 4.2, cmL For example, the official comment to Rule 4.2
provides that in an action concerning a government agency and a private party, the lawyer may
communicate "with nonlawyer representatives of the other regarding a separate matter." Id. In
this example, the comment also provides that an independently justified communication could
occur between the party and other government officials. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See id.; see also S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Formal Op. 25 (1994).
14. See S.C. App. CL R. 407, R. 4.2 cmt.
15. These repercussions include, but are not limited to, disciplinary action, suppression of
the ex parte statements, and removal of the violating attorney from the case. See Goldston v.
Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., No. 93-CP-26-740, slip op. at 13 (S.C. Ct. Com. P1. July 14,
1995).
16. See id.
17. See id. at21.
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will place the client's case in peril as important testimony will not be admitted
into evidence. Thus, it is important for attorneys to know exactly to whom they
may speak without placing their client's case, their reputation, and their law
practice in jeopardy.
3. South CarolinaRule ofEvidence 801(d)(2)
In addition to the prohibitions provided by Rule 4.2, South Carolina Rule
of Evidence 801(d)(2) also affects an attorney's ability to communicate with
a company's former employees." As applied to situations concerning ex parte
communications with former employees, Evidence Rule 801 addresses a
definitional problem, rather than a hearsay problem, as the Rule seems to
indicate.' 9 Rule 801(d)(2) delineates which former employees can impute the
corporation. 20
Many states' laws provide that no employee may make an admission on
behalf of the corporation, unless that employee was authorized to make that
communication. 21 Therefore, former employees that were low-level employees
and nonspeaking agents may not impute the organization.' However,
801(d)(2)(D) provides that a statement by "the party's agent or servant
concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made
during the existence of the relationship" is not hearsay and may be imputed to
the organization.' Therefore, the rule specifically provides that only statements
made by current employees during the existence of the employment
relationship, concerning matters within the scope ofemployment, maybe found
to be binding admissions imputable to the company.' Stated simply, Rule
801(d)(2)(D)
provides that a former employee cannot impute his former
2
employer. 5
A recent South Carolina ethics opinion concerning ex parte
communications with former employees favorably cited Rule 801 and held that
a former employee's statements could not constitute a binding admission on
behalf of the organization. 6 This long-awaited interpretation of Rule 801
should impact Rule 4.2 because it undermines the applicability of the Rules to
a company's former employees.

18. See S.C. R.EVID. 801(d)(2).
19. See NATHANM. CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITYPROBLEMS OF PRACTICE AND
THE PRoFEssioN 378-79 (2d ed. 2000).
20. See S.C. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
21. See CRYSTAL, supra note 19, at 378.
22. Id.
23. S.C. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D).
24. CRYSTAL, supra note 19, at 379.
25. Id.
26. S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Formal Op. 19 (1998).
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B. ABA Ethics Opinions

Unlike the South Carolina Bar Ethics Advisory Committee, the ABA
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility explicitly permits ex
parte communications with former employees and has clearly stated that "[t]he
prohibition of Rule 4.2 with respect to contacts by a lawyer with employees of
an opposing corporate party does not extend to former employees of that
party." 27 In the 1991 opinion, the ABA first examined Rule 4.2 and held that
corporate entities are embraced by the term "party" as stated in the Rule and the
official comment.' Rule 4.2 stands to "'preserv[e] the proper functioning of the
29
legal system and shield[] the adverse party from improper approaches.'
Thus, the issue becomes whether former employees of the adverse corporation
are members of the corporate party that need shielding.
In addressing this issue, the ABA Committee went straight to the source,
the text of Rule 4.2, and held:
While... persuasive policy arguments can be and have been
made for extending the ambit of Model Rule 4.2 to cover
some former corporate employers, the fact remains that the
text of the Rule does not do so and the comment gives no
basis for concluding that such coverage was intended.30
The Committee also expressed its reluctance to extend Rule 4.2 to cover former
employees when "the effect.., is to inhibit the acquisition of information
about one's case." 3' The ABA realized that prohibiting all ex parte
communications would serve only to hinder the adversarial process and the
quest for truth.32 Finally, the opinion stressed the need for those lawyers
making ex parte communications to protect the former employee's attorneyclient privilege and comply with the requirements of Rule 4.3.33 Therefore, a
lawyer representing a client opposing a corporate party may freely
communicate about the current action with the corporate party's former
employees without approval from corporate counsel.34
In 1995, the ABA further expanded its view on this topic in a lengthy
opinion that discussed the purpose and varied applications of Rule 4.2 . In the

27. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 359 (1991).
28. Id.
29. Id. (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof 1Responsibility, Formal Op. 108 (1934)).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.

33. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 359 (1991); see also
MODEL RULEs OF PROF'LCONDUCr R.4.3 (2000) (directing a lawyer's actions when dealing with
unrepresented persons and stating that the attorney-client privilege is the privilege of the
employer not the employee).
34. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 359 (1991).
35. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof 1Responsibility, Formal Op. 396 (1995).
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opinion, the ABA reaffirmed its 1991 opinion and again stated that Rule 4.2
permits ex parte contact with former employees ofa represented corporation.3 6
The 1995 opinion also remarked that the purpose of Rule 4.2 is not to protect
the revelation of damaging facts uncovered in an investigation of a case, but
rather to protect the attorney-client privilege. 7
C. Recent Ethics Opinionsfrom Other States
A majority of states have supported the 1991 ABA Ethics Opinion,
following the general trend of allowing ex parte communications with an
opposing corporate party's former employees." For example, a recent North
Carolina ethics opinion permitted ex parte communications with all former
employees who were not privy to any privileged communications related to the
current action.39 The opinion explicitly permits the contact because "the
plaintiff s counsel [will] not interfere with [the] Corporation's relationship with
its lawyer nor will it result in the disclosure of privileged client-lawyer
communications regarding the representation." Additionally, North Carolina's
rule prohibiting communications with represented persons would not be
"enhanced by extending the prohibition to former employees who, during the
time oftheir employment, did not participate substantively in the representation
of the organization."4'
Virginia embraced the 1991 ABA opinion and permits communications
with former employees because while a "corporation acts through its
employees," a corporation cannot act through its former employees who no
longer work for the corporation and can no longer bind the corporation.42
Florida also interpreted its version of Rule 4.2 to permit all communications
with former employees who have not maintained ties to the corporation and
have not sought representation or protection from the corporation's legal
counsel, reasoning that "Rule 4-4.2 cannot reasonably be construed as requiring
a lawyer to obtain permission of a corporate party's attorney in order to
communicate with former managers or other former employees of the
corporation.' '43 Furthermore, the Florida Ethics Committee noted that both

36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Alaska Bar Ass'n. Ethics Comm., Op. No. 1, 1991 WL 786532 (1991); Ohio
Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. No. 1,1996 WL 92872 (1996); Or. State Bar
Ass'n. Bd. of Governors, Formal Op. No. 80, 1991 WL 279182 (1991); Pa. Bar Ass'n. Comm.
on Legal Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 142, 1995 WL 929535 (Supp. 1995).
39. See N.C. State Bar, 97 Formal Ethics Opinion 2, 1997 WL 1015960 (1997).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Va. Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 1670 (1996).
43. Fla. St. Bar Ass'n. Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 88-14, 1989 WL 380139 (1989)
(amended 1996).
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Federal and Florida Rules of Evidence state that any former employee's ex
parte statements "would not be admissible against the corporation.""
In a rather lengthy but amazingly detailed and clear opinion, the
Pennsylvania Bar Association outlined all of the potential problems and
solutions in its decision to openly permit ex parte communications with former
employees.45 The Pennsylvania Bar Association noted that the majority of
courts "take the position that Rule 4.2 does not apply to former employees" as
long as the ex parte communications do not divulge the corporation's
privileged information.4 The Pennsylvania Bar Association agreed with that
position and now permits communications with a corporation's unrepresented
former employees under Rules 4.2 and 4.3.7 The opinion further details the
steps that a prudent lawyer should take in effecting a proper ex parte interview
and gives lawyers the proper disclosure instructions to avoid the appearance of
impropriety.48 By not only fully explaining its position of permitting ex parte
communications, but also by giving instructions on how to properly conduct
the communications, the Pennsylvania Bar ended the type of confusion that
now exists in South Carolina.
D. PrevailingDecisionsfrom Other States
While ex parte communication with a former employee has been addressed
by various state bar ethics committees, the issue has also been problematic for
state courts faced with confusing standards and vague guidance. Although state
courts have struggled with and issued inconsistent opinions concerning ex parte
communications with former employees in the past, a growing majority of
courts also concur with the ABA's 1991 ruling that Rule 4.2 does not apply to
former employees.
In 1990, New York paved the way for permitting ex parte communications
with former employees. In Niesig v. Team 1s° the New York Court ofAppeals
held that Model Code provision DR 7-104(A)(1) applies "only to current
employees, not to former employees.""1 The court noted that former employees
are not parties contemplated under DR 7-104(A)(1), thus the employees did not
require the protection of the rule.52 Concerning current employees, the court

44. Id.
45. See Pa. Bar Ass'n. Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 142,
1995 WL 929535 (1990).

46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. There is no ethical duty to avoid the appearance of impropriety, but basic
professional responsibility encourages lawyers to do so. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBLITY Canon 9 (1996).
49. See Robert. B. Fitzpatrick, Ex Parte Communications with Current and Former
Employees, in ALI-ABA RESOURCE MATERIALS: EMPLOYMENTANDLABORLAw (9th ed. 1999).
50. 558 N.E.2d 1030 (N.Y. 1990).
51. Id. at 1032. Substantively, DR 7-104 is identical to the current Model Rule 4.2.

52. Id at 1035-36.
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also struck down a blanket rule prohibiting all ex parte communications and
rejected a control group rule forbidding communications with all controlling
members ofthe corporation.53 The court found the control group rule unfeasible
because of the rule's lack of practicality. 4 After striking down these rules, the
New York Court of Appeals realized that "[floreclosing all direct, informal
interviews of employees of the corporate party unnecessarily sacrifices the
long-recognized potential value of such sessions.""5
In 1997, in H.B.A. Management,Inc. v. Estateof Schwartz56 the Supreme
Court of Florida held that the "Florida Rule of Professional Conduct 44.2... does not prohibit a claimant's attorney from engaging in ex parte
communications with former employees of a defendant-employer."57 For
"neither Model Rule 4.2 nor its Florida counterpart, rule 4-4.2, extend the rules'
prohibitions against contact with represented persons to former employees of
defendant-employers."58 These employees are not protected because they are
no longer the organization's speaking agents who are able to bind the
organization. 9 Former employees are essentially "free agents."' Therefore, any
statements would not be binding against the corporation because of the
employee's free-agency status. Finally, the court noted that "the whole tenor
of the comment to rule 4-4.2... indicates that the rule is concerned solely with
current employees."'62 Thus, Schwartz settles Florida's concerns about ex parte
communications, permitting such contact with former employees "unless these
individuals have maintained ties to the corporation (e.g., litigation consultant)
or are represented by counsel in the matter."'63
Missouri takes a similar stance: "An attorney can make exparte contact
without the consent of the organization's attorney for all former employees."'
These statements cannot bind the former employer corporation because such
statements do not constitute admissions.65 Former employees may only bind
their former employer "by their acts or omission while they were employed."66
Alabama agrees and states that "contact with a former employee is ethically
permissible, unless the ex parte contact is intended to deal with privileged

53. Id. at 1034.
54. Id. at 1035.
55. Id. at 1034.
56. 693 So.2d 541(Fla. 1997).
57. Id. at 542 (footnote omitted).
58. Id. at 544.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. H.B.A. Management, 693 So.2d at 545.
63. Bernard H. Dempsey, Jr., New Developments in the Law: Ex Parte Communications
with Currentand FormerEmployees ofa CorporateDefendant,FLA. B. J., Dec. 1997, at 20.
64. Garrett Hodes, Ex ParteContacts with OrganizationalEmployees in Missouri,J. Mo.
B., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 86.
65. Id. at 85-86.
66. Id. at 86.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol52/iss4/17
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matter ... and these communications were conducted for purposes of advising
the adverse party in the litigation or claim." 7 Alabama takes this concept even
further and permits communications with the former employee even if that
employee gave rise to the current action.68 In addition, the majority of the states
in the Fourth
Circuit openly permit ex parte communications with former
69
employees.
Although many states do permit ex parte communications with former
employees, South Carolina does not stand alone in its hesitant stance toward
such contacts. 0 In 1990, New Jersey strictly prohibited all ex parte
communications with both current and former employees. 1 In Public Service
Electric& Gas Companyv. AssociatedElectric& Gas InsuranceServices, Ltd.
the court ruled that Rule 4.2 prohibits all contacts with all former employees
because their statements and acts may be imputed to the corporation. 2
However, in 1996, New Jersey relaxed its stance and embraced a more flexible
standard concerning communications with former employees.73 As amended,
New Jersey Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13(a) limits ex parte conduct with
former employees that had been members of the corporation's control group.74
However, these represented former employees may disavow their corporate
representation at any time.75 If and when a former employee disavows
representation, the employee may speak freely against his former employer.7 6
With this amendment, New Jersey has now moved closer to the growing
nationwide standard of permitting ex parte communication with former
employees.

67. J. Anthony McLain, Rule 4.2 - Plaintiff's Counsel ContactingFormerEmployees of
CorporateDefendant, 60 ALA. L. REV. 420,421 (1999).
68. Id.
69. Fitzpatrick, supra note 49, at 560 (recognizing that Maryland allows ex parte
communication with former managers); id. at 575 (noting that Virginia allows ex parte
communication with former officers or employees); id. at 578 (recognizing that West Virginia
has adopted a balancing test which sometimes allows ex parte communication with former
employees).
70. Id. at 547.
71. See Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Servs., Ltd., 745 F.
Supp. 1037, 1039 (D.N.J. 1990).
72. Id.
73. See Donna duBeth Gardiner, Formerand CurrentEmployees: The New Rules on Ex
ParteContacts,N.J. LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 28; Amatuzio v. GandalfSys. Corp., 932 F. Supp.
113, 118 (D.N.J. 1996) (holding that a former employee could reveal confidential information
concerning the opposing corporate party to his personal attorney).
74. See Gardiner, supra note 73, at 28.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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I. Ex PARTE COMMUNICATIONS IN SOUTH CAROLINA
A. South Carolina'sEthics Opinions
Given the former vagueness and incorrect application of Evidence Rule
801(d)(2) and Rule 4.2, it is not surprising that no clear ethical guidelines for
communicating with an opposing company's former employees exist today in
South Carolina. For years South Carolina appeared to follow the national trend
by gradually permitting some ex parte contact with former employees.77
However, in 1997, the South Carolina Bar's Ethics Advisory Committee took
an about-face in a controversial opinion precluding most ex parte
communications."8
South Carolina first addressed the issue of ex parte communications with
former employees in 1991 when the Ethics Advisory Committee ruled that a
lawyer representing a client in an action against a corporate party could hire a
former employee of that opposing corporate party as a paralegal.79 The
Committee decided that the lawyer would not violate Rule 4.2 since "the
paralegal had no decision-making role while employed by the corporation,
possesse[d] no protected information, and [was] not likely to be called as a
witness in the litigation." ' The Ethics Advisory Committee further noted that
Rule 4.2 did not preclude its decision because the official comments did "not
directly purport to limit contact with any former employee of a corporate
party."'
A year later, the Ethics Advisory Committee ruled that, in an investigation,
a client's attorney may not contact certain former employees of an adverse
party corporation. 2 The Committee held that ex parte communications
constitute ethical violations and that opposing counsel may have a duty to
report the unethical conduct.83 The opinion went on to draw distinctions
betweenpermissible and impermissible exparte communications." It suggested
that permissible communications would include communications with two
types of former employees: (1) those who were not cognizant of, or could not
dispense, any privileged information; and (2) those who did not formally hold
a decision-making position (control group position) with the corporation." The

77. See S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Formal Op. 12 (1991); S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm.,
Formal Op. 31 (1992); S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Formal Op. 25 (1994).
78. S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Formal Op. 36 (1997).
79. S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Formal Op. 12 (1991).
80. Id.
81. Id. (noting S.C. APP. Cr. R. 407, R. 4.2).
82. S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Formal Op. 31 (1992).
83. Id.; see also S.C.APP. Cr. R. 407, R. 8.3(a) ("A lawyerhaving knowledge that another
lawyer has committed a violation of the rules of professional conduct that raises a substantial
question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall
inform the appropriate professional authority.")
84. S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Formal Op. 31 (1992).
85. Id.
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Ethics Advisory Committee ruled that former employees' acts that may have
injured the client were imputed to and bound the corporation. 6 The Committee

followed the official comment of Rule 4.2 that prohibits contact:
with persons having a managerial responsibility on behalf of
the organization, and with any other person whose act or
omission in connection with that matter may be imputed to
the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability or
whose statement may constitute an admission on the part of
the organization."
Therefore, pursuant to the official comment to Rule 4.2, the Ethics Advisory
Committee found that such ex parte communications were prohibited."
However, in the 1992 decision, the South Carolina Bar Ethics Advisory
Committee rejected a formal opinion rendered a year earlier by the American
Bar Association Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility that
adopted a tolerant view toward permitting opposing counsel's contact with
former employees.8 9 That ABA opinion stated that "[a] lawyer representing a
client in a matter adverse to a corporate party that is represented by another
lawyer may, without violating Model Rule 4.2, communicate about the subject
of the representation with an unrepresented former employee of the corporate
party without the consent of the corporation's lawyer."' The Ethics Advisory
Committee took a more conservative approach, and only looked to Rule 4.2's
text and official comment in rendering its decision. 9'
The Committee continued with its conservative approach in a 1994 opinion
dealing with whether an attorney could contact the former employees of a
defendant in a slip and fall case.' The Committee reaffirmed its 1992 decision
and limited such ex parte communications to situations where the employee's
acts and statements could not be attributed to the corporation and the
employee's actions played no part in the present action.93 Thus, the former
employees could not be interviewed if their actions could have caused the
accident in question.94 The decision also noted that Rule 4.2 "may apply more
broadly in a slip and fall case in which notice is a significant issue and a

86. Id.
87. Id. (quoting S.C. APP. Cr. R. 407, R. 4.2).
88. Id.

89. See id.
90. S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Formal Op. 31 (1992) (quoting ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 359 (1991)).
91. See id. This section of the opinion lacks sufficient analysis, as neither Rule 4.2 or the
Rules's official comments forbid ex parte communications with former employees.
92. S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Formal Op. 25 (1994).
93. Id.

94. See id.
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condition of liability," and "[c]ontact may be allowed in other types of cases
when the employee is an 'observer'. 95
The 1994 opinion noted that because "the profession has considered that
the presumptively superior skills of the trained advocate should notbe matched
with those of one not trained in law," the corporation's former employees
deserved the protection of Rule 4.2.9' In forbidding opposing counsel from
interviewing former employees, the Ethics Advisory Committee stressed the
need to protect the attorney-client privilege. The decision also required all
attorneys to abide by the requirements and official comment to Rule 4.3 when
communicating with former employees.' The ruling also counseled lawyers
contacting former corporate employees ofthe opposing party always to identify
themselves, their client, and their role in the matter.9" This formality allows
former employees to fully understand the situation and to have the opportunity
to refuse to talk to opposing counsel before obtaining their own attorney or the
corporate attorney. 99
In rendering Opinion 25, the Ethics Advisory Committee looked to other
jurisdictions' decisions regarding the matter, ranging fromNew York's holding
that under no circumstances may a former employee's communication impute
their former employer corporation,"® to New Jersey's ruling that Rule 4.2
covers all former employees,"0 ' to Montana's decision that Rule 4.2 bars ex
parte contacts only with former employees who had supervisory jobs that were
related to the action in question.' 2 At that time, South Carolina decided to take
a neutral, middle of the road position and barred only certain ex parte
communications."0 3
In 1997, the South Carolina Bar Ethics Advisory Committee made a
radical departure from previous decisions and ruled that defendant
corporation's counsel could not communicate ex parte with plaintiff
corporation's former employees concerning breach of implied warranty and
negligence claims.'
The opinion concerned a hypothetical where the
employee was a member of the corporation's "control group."'0 5 The

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.; see also S.C. APP. CT. R. 407, RL 4.3 (inferring that when acting on behalf of a
client, a lawyer must not give an unrepresented person any advice other than to seek counsel).
98. S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Formal Op. 25 (1994).

99. Id.
100. S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Formal Op. 25 (1994) (citing Niesig v. Team 1,558
N.E.2d 1030 (N.Y.1990)).
101. Id. (citing Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Serv., 745 F.
Supp. 1037 (D.NJ. 1990)). Note that New Jersey has sincemoved away from this rigid standard
and now permits some ex parte communications. See Gardiner, supranote 73, at 28.
102. S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Formal Op. 25 (1994) (citing Porter v.Arco Metals, 642
F. Supp. 1116 (D. Mont. 1988)).
103. Id.
104. S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Formal Op. 36 (1997).
105. Id.
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employee's acts while employed by the plaintiffwere not negligent and did not
give rise to the present action, but the employee could have injured the
plaintiff's claim
by potentially illustrating the plaintiff's contributory
1
negligence. 06
The Committee's short opinion simply quoted the official comment to Rule
4.2 and stated, 'The plain language of Rule 4.2 bars this ex parte contact with
this former employee because of his past managerial responsibilities concerning
the matter in litigation."'" Because the former employee was a member of the
corporation's control group, the employee's statements concerning contributory
negligence may have bound or been imputed to the corporation."' However,
the opinion failed to take into consideration South Carolina Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2), which specifically states that only current employees may impute
their employer company." °
In 1997, the South Carolina Bar Ethics Advisory Committee contradicted
the earlier 1994 and 1992 decisions."' In the Committee's 1994 opinion, the
Committee specifically held that Rule 4.2 only prohibited contact "with former
employees whose actions were alleged to be negligent on the subject matter of
the representation.".

The 1994 decision also noted, "When allegations

addressed specifically to the acts or omissions of certain employees are imputed
to the defendant, these restrictions should apply."'" 2 Therefore, the restrictions
of Rule 4.2 only apply when the case specifically refers to the actions of an
employee that may be imputed to the defendant company." 3 The opinion
implied that when the allegations are not specifically addressed to the acts of
a former employee, the Rule 4.2 restrictions do not apply and ex parte
communications are permitted." 4
In addition, the Committee's comment states that the "plain language of
Rule 4.2" bars ex parte contact because of"past managerial responsibilities.""' 5
This language has been described as: "overbroad, unsupported and
insupportable. The facts in question disclose no such 'managerial
responsibilities' but rather negate their presence, since it is a given that neither
the acts nor the statements of the former employee, while employed, would be
adversely imputed to the company."' 6 Thus, under the precedent set by the

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See id.
109. See S.C. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
110. See S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Formal Op. 36 (1997).
111. S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Formal Op. 25 (1994) (citing S.C. Bar Ethics Adv.
Comm., Formal Op. 31 (1992)).
112. Id. (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l. Responsibility, Formal Op. 359 (1991)).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Formal Op. 36 (1997).
116. John Freeman, FormerEmployees May be InterviewedExParte(Usually), S.C. LAW.
May/June 1998, at 11.
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1992 and 1994 opinions, the former employee should have been free from Rule
4.2's ex parte communications restrictions.
In 1998, the South Carolina Bar Ethics Advisory Committee reversed its
harsh treatment of ex parte communications and returned to its previous
position of allowing the communications in certain circumstances in Opinion
98-19.117 The opinion addressed a situation where a plaintiff's attorney desired
to speak with a former employee of a corporation; the attorney knew that the
employee had retained personal counsel, but was not aware of the counsel's
identity."' The Committee held that the plaintiff's attorney could
"communicate with the former employee for the sole purpose of obtaining the
name of the former employee's personal counsel."". 9 In this situation, the
plaintiff's attorney did not need to inform the corporation of any
communications because the "[fJormer employee's prior status with the
corporation is not germane to the analysis as any statements made by the
former employee would not be binding admissions nor the basis of imputed
liability to the corporation."'2
Although the situation in the 1998 opinion differs from the situations
addressed by previous opinions because the former employee had personal
counsel and the opposing attorney conducted only a limited communication,
permitting ex parte communications with former employees had a drastic
effect.12 ' Rule 4.2 only prohibits communications with persons "whose act[s]
or omission[s] may be imputed to the organization."'" Earlier ethics opinions
held that former employees' statements may still impute their former
employer.'2 However, Opinion 98-19 made sweeping strides in permitting
communications because this opinion favorably cited ABA Formal Opinions
91-359 and 95-396." These well-followed opinions permit all ex parte
communications with former employees, except those communications aimed
to divulge confidential information." In addition, the Committee correctly
interpreted and favorably cited South Carolina Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)
realizing that "any statements made by [a] former employee would not be
binding admissions."' 26 Since a former employee cannot presently hold
managerial responsibility with the corporation, and her statements cannot bind
the corporation, the employee is exempted from the restrictions of Rule 4.2.
Thus, pursuant to South Carolina Bar Ethics Advisory Committee Opinion 98117. S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Formal Op. 19 (1998).

118. Id.
119. Id.

120. Id. (citing S.C. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(B) and FED. R. EvD. 801(d)(2)(B)).
121. Id.
122. S.C. App. Ct. R. 407, R. 4.2.

123. See, e.g., S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm. Formal Op. 31 (1992) (applying Rule 4.2 to
former employees).
124. See S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Formal Op. 19 (1998).
125. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 359 (1991); ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 396 (1995).
126. S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Formal Op. 19 (1998).
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19, opposing counsel may apparently communicate with a defendant
company's former employees.
B. Conducting a ProperEx ParteCommunication
After analyzing the South Carolina Bar Ethics Advisory Committee's
decisions concerning ex parte communications with former employers, how
should a lawyer conduct an ex parte communication with an opposing party's
former employee considering that the guiding ethics opinions are varied,
inconsistent, and unclear? 27 South Carolina has a deficit of substantive case
law concerning this subject. 2 However, some lower courts in unpublished
opinions have expounded on the topic. 29 In a 1995 decision, Judge David H.
Maring, Sr. of the Fifteenth Circuit of South Carolina held that "Rule 4.2 does
not prohibit ex parte communications with former agents and employees of an
adverse corporate party who are not members of the adverse corporate party's
control group at the time of the exparte communication."'' Judge Maring held
that a former employee of a corporation who held anon-control-group position
was not made a party to the litigation, and had not retained personal legal
counsel, was "not, in his own right, aparty representedby another lawyer in the
matter within the purview of Rule 4.2."'.. In analyzing Rule 4.2, Judge Maring
stated that Rule 4.2 should not be "expansively interpreted" to prohibit all ex
parte communications with a corporation's former employees. 13 2 Therefore, at
least one of the few available opinions reveals that South Carolina courts
follow the more liberal attitudes expressed by the ABA, other states, and the
South Carolina Bar Ethics Advisory Committee's 1994 and 1998 decisions.
Even though it is now clear that some ex parte communications with
former employees are permitted in South Carolina, the lack of clear rules for
attorneys to follow further confuses the issue. In the 1994 Ethics Opinion 9425, the Committee implicitly laid out some rules for contact with former

127. See supra Part ll.A.
128. To date, no South Carolina Supreme Court or Court of Appeals' decision has
interpreted South Carolina's stance on ex parte communication with former employees.
129. See Goldston v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., No. 93-CP-26-740, slip op. (S.C. Ct.
Com. P1. July 14, 1995).
130. Id. at 15-16.
131. Id. at 15.
132. Id.Judge Maring denied opposing counsel's motion to disqualify plaintiff's attorneys
because they did not violate either Rule 4.2 or 4.3, and the plaintiff's attorneys' actions were
proper and would not cause the defense to suffer actual prejudice. Id. at 13-18. The Judge stated
that the plaintiff's attorneys' actions in soliciting affidavits in their investigation of the case
"were entirely appropriate in light of [one of the plaintiffs attorneys] ethical obligation to act
with reasonable diligence in representing the plaintiff." Id. at 21. Also, "the interests ofjustice
will not be served by fashioning a remedy for an alleged ethical violation which only serves to
prevent rather than assist the discovery of the truth." Id.; see also Brown v. Bi-Lo, Inc., No.
3215, 2000 WL 959492 at *3 n.14 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that "[a]bsent a privilege no
party is entitled to restrict an opponent's access to a witness").
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employees.' 33 The opinion stated that opposing counsel should not "induce the
former employee to violate any privilege attaching to attorney-client
communications."' Also, the lawyer initiating the contact "must make clear
the nature of the lawyer's role in the matter, including the identity of the
lawyer's client and the fact that the witness's former employee is an adverse
party."'35 Opinion 98-19 further provided that opposing counsel should
communicate in writing with a former employee to learn the identity of the
employee's personal counsel.'3 6
However, these opinions provide prudent attorneys insufficient instructions
on how to best initiate and conduct a proper ex parte communication. In
Goldston, Judge Maring favorably cited In re Domestic Air Transportation
AntitrustLitigation. 37 In In re Domestic Air Transportationa Georgia federal
court required the defendant airlines to provide information concerning former
employees so the plaintiffs could properly conduct ex parte interviews with
these employees. 3 The court did not require the plaintiffs to notify the
defendant airlines of the upcoming interviews nor did it require the defendants
to have counsel present to represent their former employees.' However, the
court required the plaintiffs to adhere to Rule 4.3 and stated:
[P]rior to making any ex parte contact with former employees
of the defendant airlines, plaintiffs must deliver to the former
employee a letter informing her of the nature of the lawyer's
role in the matter giving occasion for the contact, including
the identity of the lawyer's client and the fact that the
witness's former employer is an adverse party. Counsel must
also inform the former employee that she has no obligation to
talk with plaintiff's counsel. The Court will not require, as
requested by defendants, that the letter include the name,
address, and telephone number of the relevant corporate
defendant's counsel.'"
Prudent attorneys should consider following the guidelines in In re Domestic
Air Transportationand take the same precautions when conducting an ex parte

133. S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Formal Op. 25 (1994).
134. Id.
135. Id. (citation omitted).
136. S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Formal Op. 19 (1998).
137. See Goldston v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., No. 93-CP-26-740, slip op. at 16
(S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. July 14, 1995) (citingIn re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 141 F.R.D.
556 (N.D. Ga.1992)).
138. See In re Domestic Air Transp. AntitrustLitig., 141 F.R.D. 556,562 (N.D. Ga. 1992)
(granting plaintiff's motion to compel American Airlines, United Airlines, USAir, and Delta
Airlines to provide information concerning former employees, expense reports, and other
important documents concerning the government's investigation of airline fares and practices).
139. Id.
140. Id.
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interview. A letter, such as the one outlined above, sent to the former employee
defining the situation gives the employee the opportunity to understand her
rights, educates her on the reason for the interview, and enables her to obtain
optional personal legal counsel. Because the letter does not require the naming
of the opposing corporate counsel, the former employee will not feel forced to
contact opposing counsel, but will instead be able to make an independent
decision about whether to speak to opposing counsel. The attorney also needs
to advise the former employee that the attorney is not interested in information
protected by the employee's fiduciary duty (attorney-client privileged
information).141 Thus, before initiating an ex parte communication with a
former employee of the opposing party, a prudent attorney should first notify
the former employee in writing to fully disclose the attorney's position, the
attorney's responsibilities to the client, and the attorney's responsibilities to the
former employee.
C. Recommendationsfor the Future
Although attorneys would be wise to follow the guidelines set forth above,
South Carolina has yet to explain why the state remains in the minority of
jurisdictions still qualifying the instances in which ex parte communications
with unrepresented former employees are permitted. South Carolina should
take heed of other states' actions and join the ever growing number of states
that adhere to ABA Committee Opinion 91-359.142
First, South Carolina should adopt the reasoning set forth inNiesigv. Team
I and eliminate all remnants of the control group rule. 143 In corporate cases
where incidents giving rise to the cause of action occurred years ago, attorneys
often have difficulty accurately determining who were the members of a
company's control group.' Further, in large corporations, who are the
members of the control group? Does the group consist of only members ofthe
board of directors or does it extend down into middle and lower management?
The control group standard is impractical because there is no clear legal
definition of a control group. 45 Because of the practical problems associated
with determining the members of the control group, South Carolina should
simply discontinue its use.
Secondly, South Carolina should permit communications with all former
employees because former employees cannot possibly bind or impute their
former employer corporation." Former employees are "free agents," and as
such, they are not committed to their former employer; therefore, they cannot

141. Freeman, supra note 116, at 12.
142. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 359 (1991).
143. Niesig v. Team I, 558 N.E.2d 1030 (N.Y. 1990).
144. See id.
145. See id. at 1035 (acknowledging the "practical and theoretical problems posed by the
'control group' test").
146. See S.C. R. EvID. 801; S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Formal Op. 19 (1998).
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

17

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 17
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52: 775

bind their former employer. 47 Thus, any statements made by former employees
are oftheir own accord and should not be attributable to their former employer.
South Carolina should adopt this "free agency" standard and realize that former
employees consider themselves "free" of their former employer's restraints;
therefore, they should also be "free" from their former employer's corporate
counsel. In addition, South Carolina should follow Alabama's example and
abandon its 1994 opinion that prohibits contact with former employees whose
conduct gave rise to the cause of action." s Because the former employee
becomes a free agent after the employment ends, any statement or action by
that employee would be the employee's own and not imputable to the
corporation.
Ordinarily, nothing prevents an individual who has information relevant
to a case from speaking to attorneys on either side. However, if the individual
has information because of his former employment, suddenly he is forbidden
from assisting both sides of the action. Somehow this technique only seems to
protect one side's interests and sets up more impediments in the investigation
for the truth.
If South Carolina insists on maintaining restrictions on ex parte contacts
with former employees, the State should consider adopting New Jersey's
"disavowing" technique. 49 Under that approach, a represented former
employee may individually make the decision whether to keep the
representation and protection of her former employer or to give up counsel and
speak freely with opposing counsel. In essence, the disavowing technique
allows the employee, not the employer, to control the situation. Disavowing
also promotes access to all potential witnesses and makes the playing field a bit
more level for individual plaintiffs while still maintaining a great deal of
protection for the corporation.
Finally, South Carolina currently extends the protections afforded by Rule
4.2 to former employees because trained advocates-corporate counsel-may
better protect the employees from the action's potential harm than the
employees can protect themselves.' The South Carolina Bar Ethics Advisory
Committee explicitly prohibits unrestricted ex parte communication with
former employees because the communication would break the attorney-client
privilege and harm the employee.' However, the State can still protect the
attorney-client privilege and permit ex parte communications with former
employees. The State should rely on Rule 4.3 and Rule 4.4 to protect these
employees. Rule 4.3 instructs lawyers on how to properly deal with
unrepresented clients.'52 Unless the former employee has her own private
counsel, the employee is considered unrepresented because when she left her
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

See H.B.A. Managment, Inc. v. Estate of Schwartz, 693 So.2d 541, 544 (Fla. 1997).
See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
See S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Formal Op. 31 (1992).
See S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Formal Op. 25 (1994).
See MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CoNDuCT R. 4.3 (2000).
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job, she also left the corporate counsel's representation that came with the job.
Therefore, Rule 4.3 will still protect the employee. Rule 4.4 will also protect
corporate counsel because opposing counsel may not use her access to former
employees to burden or violate the legal rights of the corporation."' If
corporate counsel believes that an ethics violation has occurred in opposing
counsel's ex parte communications, corporate counsel may still seek relief
under Rule 4.3 and Rule 4.4.54 Thus, South Carolina may still meet its primary
goal to zealously protect the privileges of former employees without
categorizing the employees as represented persons under Rule 4.2.
IV. CONCLUSION

Currently, the South Carolina Bar Ethics Advisory Committee is undecided
on whether to permit ex parte communications with former employees. The
Committee's 1998 opinion appeared to have finally opened the door for such
communications, but unfortunately, the opinion still does not plainly endorse
ex parte communications with former employees. Without a recent upper level
case discussing these communications, the issue remains veiled in mystery.
South Carolina should abandon the subjective, illogical, and undefinable
control group standard. The State should realize that the federal and state rules
of evidence prevent former employees' statements from ever imputing their
former corporate employers. Therefore, South Carolina should follow the
current trend and permit ex parte communications as outlined in the ABA's
1991 opinion.' s5 South Carolina should embrace this opportunity to clarify this
issue and eliminate its implicit endorsement of corporate counsel's habit of
inhibiting aplaintifffrom obtaining necessary information concerning her case.
Sharyn M. Epley

153. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCT R. 4.4 (2000).
154. See id.; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCT R. 4.3 (2000).
3 59
(1991).
155. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op.
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